The word scofflaw, while often thought to be of ancient origin, was actually created through a contest held in 1921. A wealthy banker in Quincy, MA sponsored a contest offering $200 to anyone who coined a word to describe people who violated Prohibition. The winning entry met with nearly-universal disapproval, and was satirized in cartoons appearing in the New York Tribune–which ironically gave it a national audience. It largely died out with the end of Prohibition, but was resurrected in the 1950s mainly as a way of labeling those who failed to pay traffic and parking tickets. It still is in use today, but now refers to anyone who habitually violates the law and avoids paying fines.
The so-called CSI Effect–named after the hit t.v. show CSI: Crime Scene Investigation and its progeny–refers to the theory that these shows have an impact on real juries in criminal cases. In them, highly-trained lab specialists with limitless budgets and the newest technology find a great deal of trace and other evidence that they able to quickly, reliably and objectively analyze to identify the guilty culprit, because “the evidence never lies.” What the actual result is of this effect is hotly debated: prosecutors believe it leads to a greater number of acquittals, because jurors expect more than the scientific evidence can often reasonably deliver. Defense lawyers, in contrast, worry that jurors give too much deference to such testimony and are oblivious to the number of false convictions that have resulted from faulty analysis of evidence.
‘To shudder at the bare recital of those acts‘: Child Abuse, Family, and Montreal Courts in the Early Nineteenth Century, in G. Blaine Baker and Donald Fyson, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol. XI, Quebec and the Canadas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2013) 370-426.
In 1971 a plaintiff filed a pauper’s suit in U.S. District Court, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated, against Satan and his servants. Plaintiff alleged that Satan had “threatened him, caused him misery, impeded his course in life, and generally precipitated his downfall”. His suit was unsuccessful, the court denying him relief on the grounds that (a) it had “serious doubts that the complaint reveals a cause of action upon which relief can be granted”; (b) there were no allegations of defendant’s residence in the district; and (c) if allowed, the Court could not determine if the plaintiff would “fairly protect the interests of the class”. The Court also noted that plaintiff had not provided instructions as to how to serve process upon the defendant. The case may be found at U.S. ex rel. Gerald Mayo v. Satan And His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (1971).
One thing seems clear: if the suit had been allowed to proceed, the Prince of Darkness probably would have had no trouble putting together a ‘dream team’ of defense lawyers!
Recently an Ohio man learned that it is possible to be alive and yet legally dead at the same time. Donald Eugene Miller Jr. vanished from his home in Ohio in 1986 and was declared legally dead in 1994. A recovering alcoholic, in October 2013 he resurfaced and petitioned the probate court to reverse the ruling, but his appeal was denied. Ohio puts a three year limit on such appeals, leaving Miller in a legal limbo: he is unable to get a driver’s license or restate his Social Security number as he is still considered legally dead, and the probate court cannot reverse the ruling since his right of appeal lapsed in 1997.
While Vermont abolished the death penalty in 1965, it still has one capital crime on the books: treason. Vermont law states that “[a] person owing allegiance to this state, who levies war or conspires to levy war against the same, or adheres to the enemies thereof, giving them aid and comfort, within the state or elsewhere, shall be guilty of treason against this state and shall suffer the punishment of death.”
Under Massachusetts law, gift certificates must remain valid for a minimum of seven years. They are required to have an expiry and issuance date specified on them (or, in the case of electronic gift cards, this must be on the receipt or available through the issuer), or otherwise they are considered to not expire. Issuers are not allowed to charge fees that reduce the value of gift certificates, including periodic or service fees, or fees for non-use.
Good Samaritan laws, often confused with duty to rescue laws, provide immunity against tort claims for those who attempt to rescue someone in peril. In general, however, these laws provide immunity if the peril was imminent, if the rescuer obtained consent, or if consent was implied. Some U.S. jurisdictions provide immunity only to trained emergency services personnel.
Most common law countries impose no general duty to rescue another person, and therefore typically impose no liability for failing to do so. There are two exceptions to this: (a) people who create a hazardous situation, regardless of whether they did so negligently, are held to have a duty towards those they have imperiled; and (b) people who have “special relationships” with those to which they owe a duty of care, either through position or employment. Examples of these special relationships would be the duty of emergency workers to the public (e.g., firefighters, EMTs, etc.). However, non-emergency personnel can also have duties to rescue, most notably parents towards their children (or people acting in loco parentis, such as school teachers and babysitters), a spouse towards his or her partner, and a property owner towards people who are lawfully on their property (such as hoteliers to their guests). In the case of non-emergency workers, the duty to rescue is obviated should a rescuer’s own life be imperiled through the attempt. As of 2009, ten states had laws that required that third parties, at a minimum, notify law enforcement or seek to aid people in peril.
The George Zimmerman case shone a spotlight on Florida’s ‘stand your ground’ law, an extension of the “castle doctrine” which is an ancient common law concept that a homeowner has no duty to retreat when threatened within his or her home by a third party. The castle doctrine exists in law in virtually every state, in some form, including Massachusetts:
Section 8A. In the prosecution of a person who is an occupant of a dwelling charged with killing or injuring one who was unlawfully in said dwelling, it shall be a defense that the occupant was in his dwelling at the time of the offense and that he acted in the reasonable belief that the person unlawfully in said dwelling was about to inflict great bodily injury or death upon said occupant or upon another person lawfully in said dwelling, and that said occupant used reasonable means to defend himself or such other person lawfully in said dwelling. There shall be no duty on said occupant to retreat from such person unlawfully in said dwelling.
Stand your ground laws are essentially extensions of the castle doctrine to outside the walls of one’s personal residence and were generally passed in 2005 or later. On the books of nearly half of the states, stand your ground laws generally allow people to use force (including deadly force) to defend themselves if they feel threatened, and in some states has been extended to include businesses, vehicles and anywhere that the individual is lawfully occupying (such as Florida’s law). These laws include varying degrees of requirements as to when citizens may use deadly force. Prior to these laws being promulgated, citizens were required to flee from an attacker before using force as a last resort.
Under the common law, originally there were only two felonies related to injuries to a home. The first was the criminal invasion of a home, or burglary (originally known as “house breach”), while the more serious of the two involved the criminal destruction of a home, or arson (derived from the Old French “arder”, meaning “to burn”). It was originally treated as a capital felony given not only the destruction of the victim’s personal property but the serious threat it accorded to public safety in a time when homes were typically made of wood and had thatched roofs. Until the 13th century it was punished by death by burning, although in the middle ages this was changed to hanging.
Arson was defined under the common law as consisting of the “malicious burning of the dwelling of another.” This was defined quite strictly: while “malice” in this context also included acts that created a substantial risk of fire rather than requiring intentionality, “dwelling” was limited to an occupied structure not possessed or occupied by the perpetrator. Thus, razing one’s one home historically did not constitute arson, nor did burning down a home that one rented.
Interestingly, until fairly recently there were no other criminal offences in English law related to damage to property– burning down a building that was a not a house or granary could be punishable by a civil action of trespass, but was not a felony. Over time various statutes filled in gaps, and were consolidated in the mid-ninetheenth century (Malicious Damage Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98). In 1971 the separate offenses were replaced by unlawfully destroying or damaging property (Criminal Damage Act 1971, c. 48).